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David Shambaugh, of George Washington University, has published extensively on Chinese 
affairs. His newest book, China Goes Global, can only consolidate his reputation as a leading 
scholar in this field. It is based on five years research, well written and accessible also for non-
specialists. He draws on an impressive range of sources, not the least numerous interviews with 
officials, and his results are healthy antidotes to many exaggerations which circulate in the media, 
but also in parts of academia. 
Some observers have claimed that China will “rule the world”. For Shambaugh this is 
“profoundly overstated”. Approvingly he quotes Joseph Nye who states that “this magnification 
of China, which creates fear in the U.S. and hubris in China, is the biggest danger we face” (p. 
311). In Shambaugh’s view, China has “a long way to go before it becomes – if it ever becomes - 
a true global power” (p.6). China’s “foodprint” across the globe is broad, but not particularly 
deep. Furthermore, China remains a “lonely power”, having neither close friends nor allies. Even 
in its closest relationships (North Korea, Pakistan, Russia) “strong elements of distrust percolate 
beneath the surface”. Only in some sectors does China “actually exercise global influence: global 
trade patterns, global energy and commodity markets, the global tourism industry, global sales of 
luxury goods, global real estate purchases, and cyber hacking … Other than in these limited areas 
… China does not really influence global events”. Nor does China try to positively resolve any 
global problems. “Generally speaking, Chinese diplomacy remains remarkably risk-averse and 
guided by narrow national interests”. When it comes to subjects such as Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, 
human rights or maritime territorial claims, Beijing becomes “hypervigilant”, but in most other 
issues it remains “extremely passive for a state of its size and importance”. 
According to Shambaugh, the main motive behind China’s external policy is support for 
the country’s economic modernization. Another important aim is buttressing the power monopoly 
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of the Communist Party, yet another one to guard China against security threats, in a wide sense. 
Shambaugh also adds the “Imperatives of History” to this list, but here for once his text becomes 
vague. It is important to notice that “ruling the world” is not on Beijing’s list. As Vice Foreign 
Minister Cui Tiankai put it in 2012: “China’s position is far behind the United States … We have 
been elevated [in the eyes of others] against our will. We have no intention to compete for global 
leadership”. This is perfectly credible, given the point that China’s economy is deeply embedded 
in the world economy. This has created a strong Chinese interest in world-wide stability. There 
have been some bouts of Chinese assertiveness, for instance in 2009, which destroyed a lot of 
good-will towards China, but they do not change the general picture of a prudent and cautious 
policy. True, in China there is a current of what Shambaugh calls “offensive” realists. They want 
China to use its new power, including force “when necessary”. These circles entertain a strong 
sense of vindictiveness and retribution. But they also feel frustration because Beijing does exactly 
not behave the way they want it.  
Through the modernization of her armed forces, China has accumulated “hard power” - to 
the worry of many of her neighbors. And in three fields she can actually project power globally. 
China possesses by now a significant missile force with presumably 400-600 nuclear warheads. 
This gives China offensive capabilities and a second-strike nuclear deterrent. China is also 
developing substantial antisatellite capabilities. This has alarmed many in the United States 
because the US military and intelligence agencies rely heavily on satellites. China is also “widely 
known to be the most aggressive cyber state in the world today”. In other fields, however, China 
has got very limited possibilities. For instance, sustained naval operations far away from China’s 
coasts are out of reach for a long time to come, due to a long list of lacking prerequisites, e.g. 
naval bases outside her territory. Beijing has repeatedly declared that it does not want any.  
In the economic sphere, China certainly influences matters globally, e.g. through her 
strong demand for energy and raw materials, or through her export successes. Not so much as 
investor, some sensational media reports notwithstanding. The stock of Chinese Direct 
Investment is comparable to those of Denmark or Taiwan. And there are very few Chinese 
corporations which can operate truly globally: The three national oil companies Sinopec, 
CNOOC and CNPC, Huawei (telecom) and Haier (household appliances). Most other companies 
have at best a limited foreign presence. Their competitiveness on foreign markets remains often 
restricted because they, for instance, seldom hire non-Chinese managers, which limits their 
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knowledge of these markets. “Chinese firms … are extremely hierarchical. This makes for … a 
climate of risk aversion and disincentives to take the initiative … Chinese tend not to adept well 
to flat management structures which prize decentralization and individual initiative”. This is one 
reason why mergers and acquisitions with non-Chinese companies often end in failure. 
It is not lost on Chinese officials that China’s image is an important factor when it comes 
to international influence. Consequently, Beijing has invested much money in public diplomacy 
and campaigns of various sorts. With very little success because certain aspects of the political 
system impact negatively on China’s image. Putting restrictions on the work of foreign 
correspondents or arresting dissidents are simply actions which most people regard as 
unsympathetic. And as long as the Chinese media remain under government control, they cannot 
be competitive internationally. “We have a credibility problem”, observed Zhu Yinghuang, a 
former editor of China Daily. Many Chinese officials seem to have an understanding of “soft 
power” meaning doing propaganda or public diplomacy. But for Joseph Nye, who coined the 
term, and Shambaugh it is an intrinsic ability to attract others, and “grows out of a country’s 
culture, political values, and foreign policies”. It is mainly about a society to attract others, not a 
government to persuade others. Minister Wang Chen, responsible for the State Council 
Information Office, asked Shambaugh what China should do to improve its soft power. He 
answered: “Just get the government out of your own people’s way. China has an enormously 
talented society – just let it speak for itself”. 
All in all, Shambaugh’s results may be surprising for some readers. But the reviewer 
thinks that even those who do not share Shambaugh’s conclusions will find his book “exciting”. 
 
